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66 
ON BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT
Timothy M. Mulvaney* 
In his recent article, Bargaining for Development Post-Koontz, 
Professor Sean Nolon builds off the pioneering work of Carol Rose, Tony 
Arnold, and select other property scholars to highlight the role of 
negotiation in land use law.1 In so doing, he offers a fine contribution to 
the longstanding debate on regulatory takings law as it pertains to the 
often bargained-for conditions, or “exactions,” state entities attach to 
land-use permits. In theory, these conditional permits aim to counter 
proposed development projects’ external harms in lieu of denying those 
proposals outright. Professor Nolon concludes that the Supreme Court’s 
recent ill-defined expansion of the circumstances in which such 
conditions might give rise to takings liability in Koontz v. St. John’s River 
Water Management District2 will chill the state’s willingness to 
communicate with permit applicants about mitigation measures.3 He sets 
out five courses that government entities might take in this confusing and 
chilling post-Koontz world, each of which leaves something to be desired 
from the perspective of both developers and the public more generally.4 
This responsive essay proceeds in two parts. First, it illuminates the 
chilling effect Professor Nolon perceives by explaining Koontz’s 
grounding in the retroactive takings compensation principle adopted by 
the Supreme Court nearly thirty years ago in First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles.5 Second, it 
suggests that Professor Nolon’s list of potential government responses to 
Koontz can be expanded to include at least five additional (if admittedly 
more radical) courses, several of which may hold slightly more promise 






                                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. I thank Mark Fenster and 
Christopher Serkin for reviewing earlier versions of this essay. I am grateful for the fine research 
assistance of Matthew McGowan. 
 1. Sean F. Nolon, Bargaining for Development Post-Koontz: How the Supreme Court 
Invaded Local Government, 67 FLA. L. REV. 171, 192 (2014). 
 2. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
 3. See Nolon, supra note 1, at 219. This reflects, as Mark Fenster describes it, a 
“consequential focus [that] is the source of [Nolon’s] article’s strength.” See Mark Fenster, 
Regulating in the Post-Koontz World, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 26 (2015). 
 4. Nolon, supra note 1, at 211–19. 
 5. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles Cnty., 482 U.S. 
304 (1987). 
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I.  THE ROOTS OF KOONTZ’S CHILLING EFFECT 
Until the 1980s, it was largely understood that the state need not pay 
compensation for property later found to be taken by a regulatory action 
if the state repealed that regulatory action immediately upon the takings 
finding.6 Yet in its 1987 decision in First English, the Supreme Court 
concluded that “where the government’s activities have already worked 
a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government 
can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during 
which the taking was effective.”7  
There is broad agreement that First English’s holding requiring 
compensation in these instances has a chilling effect on government 
regulation.8 Determining whether a regulation amounts to a compensable 
taking usually is dependent on a fact-sensitive analysis first discussed in 
the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. City of New York, 9 which requires inquiries about the economic impact 
of the regulation, the claimant’s investment-backed expectations, and the 
character of the government action at issue. After First English, 
legislators and administrators alike are hesitant to adopt new regulatory 
programs in light of the possibility that, given the nature of a Penn 
Central analysis, they might inadvertently step over the indistinct Penn 
Central line and, even despite immediately withdrawing the now-
deemed-unconstitutional measure, possibly be forced to pay a 
considerable amount of money for the period during which that measure 
was in place.10 And, at least according to the recent state appellate court 
decision on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, Koontz extends this 
retroactive temporary takings compensation principle to the realm of 
exactions.  
Koontz comes in the wake of the Supreme Court’s companion cases 
                                                                                                                     
 6. The next two paragraphs draw in part from a previously published book chapter. See 
Timothy M. Mulvaney, Temporary Takings, More or Less, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON 
OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 463 (Randall S. Abate, ed., 
Oxford University Press) (2015). 
 7. Id. at 465. 
 8. See, e.g., Daniel L. Siegel, The Impact of Tahoe-Sierra on Temporary Takings Law, 23 
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. 273, 274 (2005); Donald W. Large, The Supreme Court and the Takings 
Clause: The Search for a Better Rule, 18 ENVTL. L. 3, 42 (1987). 
 9. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). There are two types of regulations outside the exactions 
context that are not subject to a deferential level of judicial scrutiny, for the Supreme Court has 
asserted that they amount to categorical takings: those regulations that result in a permanent 
physical invasion, as set out in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 
439 (1982), or a total economic wipeout, in accord with Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1019 (1992). 
 10. See, e.g., Lynda L. Butler, State Environmental Programs: A Study in Political 
Influence and Regulatory Failure, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 830 (1990). 
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of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission11 and Dolan v. City of 
Tigard,12 which together held that the state—as the defendant—shoulders 
the burden of proving that some unspecified class of permit conditions 
bear an “essential nexus” to and are in “rough proportionality” with the 
proposed development’s impacts to avoid having to pay takings 
compensation. When compared to Penn Central, these decisions have 
been described as imposing a form of heightened scrutiny in the sense 
that their tests place the burden of proof on the defendant government 
entity, authorize a searching review of the relationship between an 
exaction’s structure and the public objectives in imposing that exaction, 
and allow for takings liability findings in instances where the economic 
impact of the exaction is minimal.13 In this sense, the chilling effect 
recognized after First English in the context of ordinary regulations may 
be all the more pronounced in the exactions context. An abridged review 
of Koontz illustrates the point. 
Koontz bought a 15-acre lot consistently predominantly of wetlands 
for just under $100,000 in 1972. The state condemned one acre of 
Koontz’s parcel in 1987, paying approximately $400,000 in “just 
compensation” (including severance damages). Years later, Koontz 
sought permission from the state’s regional water district to build a 
shopping mall on the remaining 14 acres. After reviewing Koontz’s 
permit application, the water district originally proposed conditions that, 
in its view, would mitigate the mall’s wetland impacts.14 Koontz scoffed 
at the proposed conditions. The water district then withdrew those 
conditions and denied the requested permit, after which Koontz promptly 
filed a takings suit. The water district ultimately reconsidered its 
decision—for reasons that are not altogether clear—and unconditionally 
granted the permit after the case had crawled along for several years in 
the face of disputed procedural issues. Yet, with permit in hand, Koontz 
continued to press his claim for takings compensation.15 In the course of 
                                                                                                                     
 11. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 12. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
 13. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1607–08 (1988); 
Douglas Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 
88 Colum. L. Rev. 1630, 1651 (1988); Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional 
Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 859, 868 (1995); Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan 
Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158, 2184–
87 (2002); Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the 
Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 609, 622; Otto J. Hetzel & Kimberly A. Gough, 
Assessing the Impact of Dolan v. City of Tigard on Local Governments’ Land-Use Powers, in 
TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS 
219 (David L. Callies ed., 1996); Donald C. Guy & James E. Holloway, The Direction of 
Regulatory Takings Analysis in the Post-Lochner Era, 102 DICK. L. REV. 327, 346 (1998). 
 14. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2592–93 (2013). 
 15. See St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1224–25 (Fla. 2011). 
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this lengthy litigation, Koontz sold his 14 acres to a development 
company for $1.2 million.  
Roughly converting these figures to today’s dollars, Koontz 
purchased the parcel for approximately $550,000 and sold it for 
approximately $2.25 million without ever having made any 
improvements. Recognizing as much, he appropriately conceded that he 
had no viable Penn Central claim. However, in 2009, a state appellate 
panel determined that Koontz was entitled to $477,000 in takings 
compensation for the property’s lost rental value over the period of time 
between the denial of his original development application and the 
issuance of the permit in light of the fact that the initially proposed 
conditions did not comport with Nollan and Dolan’s standards.16  
In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that, where a 
governmental entity (i) proposes permit conditions but (ii) later 
withdraws those proposed conditions and (iii) makes a decision to 
approve or deny the requested permit, those temporarily proposed 
conditions are subject to the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan.17 
The decision describes Koontz as presenting a dispute that fits within 
Nollan and Dolan’s “special application” of the Court’s unconstitutional 
conditions jurisprudence.18 This description is peculiar for, among other 
reasons, the Court stated that nothing was ever actually taken from 
Koontz.19 Further complicating matters, the Court did not discuss what 
remedy, if any, might be available to a claimant who successfully argues 
that a proposed condition does not pass Nollan and Dolan muster, stating 
that “[b]ecause [Koontz] brought his claim pursuant to a state law cause 
of action, the Court has no occasion to discuss what remedies might be 
available for a Nollan/Dolan unconstitutional conditions violation either 
here or in other cases.”20  
                                                                                                                     
 16. See St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 5 So. 3d 8, 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009), 
decision quashed, 77 So. 3d 1220 (Fla. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (U.S. 2013). 
 17. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596. 
 18. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005). 
 19. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597 (2013) (concluding that “nothing has been taken”). See 
also John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 22 NYU ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1, 27 (2014) (“Justice Alito has implicitly adopted the novel, indeed bizarre position that the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine should apply even in the absence of government action that 
violates the Constitution.”). 
 20. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597. The body of scholarship assessing the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Koontz is rapidly expanding. For relatively favorable treatment, see, e.g., Shelley Ross 
Saxer, To Bargain or Not to Bargain? A Response to Bargaining For Development Post-Koontz, 
67 FLA. L. REV. F. 5 (2015); Ilya Somin, Two Steps Forward for the “Poor Relation” of 
Constitutional Law: Koontz, Arkansas Game & Fish, and the Future of the Takings Clause, CATO 
SUP. CT. REV. 215, 216 (2013); Richard Epstein, “Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management 
District: Of Issues Resolved—and Shoved under the Table,” 
http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/2013/06/koontz-v-st-johns-river-water-management-
district-of-issues-resolved--and-shoved-under-the-table.php. For more critical treatment, see, e.g., 
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Yet on remand, the state appellate court recently concluded that its 
earlier decision was “entirely consistent” with the Supreme Court’s 
decision.21 Therefore, it “reaffirm[ed]” its compensation award for lost 
rents over the period of time between the denial of Koontz’s original 
development application and the issuance of the permit.22 One could thus 
interpret this appellate decision as working to expand First English’s 
retroactive takings compensation principle to at least some government 
communications made during pre-decisional negotiation sessions and 
subjecting such communications to the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and 
Dolan.  
Though the point received scant attention in this recent appellate 
decision, it is not altogether evident which communications actually are 
subject to Nollan and Dolan. The Supreme Court had stated that it was 
declining to reach the state’s claim that the proposed conditions at issue 
in the case might be “too indefinite” or not “concrete and specific” 
enough to be considered a “demand” that “give[s] rise to liability under 
Nollan and Dolan.”23 Moreover, while the Court declared Nollan and 
Dolan applicable to some subset of monetary conditions, it did little to 
explain the distinction, if any, between monetary exactions, fees, and 
taxes.24 Further, the Court did not broach the longstanding debate over 
whether Nollan and Dolan’s heightened scrutiny, which is applicable to 
those exactions imposed administratively on a case-by-case basis, also 
should be applicable to those exactions resulting from broadly applicable 
legislation.25  
With such uncertainties, the unsettling lesson permitting entities can 
deduce from the recent state court decision on remand in Koontz is 
twofold. First, where the state could deny a permit application under 
existing law but considers issuing the permit with conditions (be they 
monetary or otherwise) to counter the detrimental impacts of the project, 
those conditions may be subject to the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and 
Dolan. Second, where the landowner/permittee successfully challenges 
any proposed condition as violative of Nollan and Dolan, the state will 
                                                                                                                     
Echeverria, supra note 19; John D. Echeverria, The Costs of Koontz, 39 VT. L. REV. 573 (2015); 
Christopher Serkin, The Winners and Losers in Negotiating Exactions: A Response to Sean Nolon, 
67 FLA. L. REV. F. 9, 10 (2015); Mark Fenster, Substantive Due Process by Another Name: 
Koontz, Exactions, and the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 30 TOURO L. REV. 403, 404 (2014); 
Mulvaney, supra note 6, at 467. 
 21. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 2014 WL 1703942, at *1 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2014).  
 22. Id.  
 23. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598.   
 24. See, e.g., Justin R. Pidot, Fees, Expenditures, and the Takings Clause, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
131 (2014); Saxer, supra note 20. 
 25. See, e.g., Timothy M. Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions and Progressive Property, 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
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be required to pay the landowner/permittee compensation for the period 
of time during which that proposed condition was on the table, even if it 
withdrew that condition on or before the date of the judgment.  
II.  THE STATE’S PLIGHT AFTER KOONTZ 
Professor Nolon sets out five rather unappealing courses that 
government entities could take in this confusing and chilling post-Koontz 
world: (1) negotiate without making offers;26 (2) insulate negotiation 
“through pre-approval processes and waiver;”27 (3) negotiate despite the 
risks;28 (4) hire a mediator who can facilitate negotiation among non-
government stakeholders;29 or (5) deny permit applications outright.30 
Building on Professor Nolon’s lucid analysis, the first section below 
outlines the drawbacks of these courses. The second section suggests that 
there are at least five additional courses—all of which admittedly come 
with their own shortcomings and risks—that might be important to 
consider in future discussions on governmental action in the face of 
Koontz. 
A.  Professor Nolon’s Proposed Post-Koontz Options                          
for Land Use Boards 
The first two courses set out by Professor Nolon require clearness on 
the circumstances under which, in the Supreme Court’s words, a 
“demand” should be deemed sufficiently “concrete and specific,” and not 
“too indefinite.” In this regard, Professor Nolon asserts that “[a] demand 
is ‘definite’ when the board has made a commitment that if the landowner 
incorporates the condition into the application, the board will approve the 
application,” and “‘specific’ when the board describes the condition with 
sufficient detail to provide clarity from an engineering perspective.”31 
These important preliminary suggestions about the reach of Koontz open 
up new conversations about the meaning of “commitment,” “sufficient 
detail,” and “clarity” in this context. These are the very types of 
conversations that no doubt will continue in the courts and among 
academic commentators for some time. At this point, though, it is not 
apparent that the first two courses Professor Nolon proffers present any 
shelter from the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan and the 
associated retroactive compensation remedy. The same could be said of 
the third, negotiate-despite-the-risks course, for it amounts to maintaining 
the government’s pre-Koontz strategy.  
                                                                                                                     
 26. Nolon, supra note 1, at 215. 
 27. Id. at 211. 
 28. Id. at 216. 
 29. Id. at 212. 
 30. Id. at 211–12. 
 31. Id. at 208. 
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Professor Nolon acknowledges as much about the first three courses, 
and aptly notes that the fourth course also is problematic for it, among 
other reasons, removes from the discussion the very planning officials 
and technical staff who have the expertise (and the public charge) to study 
and evaluate threats to the community resulting from proposed 
development projects.32  
To Professor Nolon, then, this leaves the state to the fifth course of 
issuing more outright permit denials without conversing with applicants 
about alternatives in an effort to avoid the risk of confronting heightened 
exaction takings scrutiny.33 He specifically notes how this course could 
harm developers by reducing the amount of issued permits,34 though it 
also could harm the public in the sense that it eschews all context-
dependent administration of permit applications in favor of rigid 
application of formulaic land use restrictions.35  
B.  Additional Post-Koontz Options for Land Use Boards 
It seems there are at least five additional courses not mentioned by 
Professor Nolon that the government could take in the chilling post-
Koontz environment. They include: (6) issuing more unconditioned 
permits; (7) strategically proposing alongside other conditions a 
constitutionally acceptable condition that is unpalatable to the applicant; 
(8) fashioning land use restrictions not as exactions but rather as use 
limitations; (9) asserting that conditions deemed illegal under the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine cannot be construed as legal acts that 
take property for a public use; and (10) renewing an unqualified challenge 
                                                                                                                     
 32. Id. at 214. 
 33. Cf. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2610 (2013) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting) (“[O]bservers have wondered whether those decisions have inclined some local 
governments to deny permit applications outright, rather than negotiate agreements that could 
work to both sides’ advantage. But that danger would rise exponentially if something less than a 
clear condition—if each idea or proposal offered in the back-and-forth of reconciling diverse 
interests—triggered Nollan-Dolan scrutiny. At that point, no local government official with a 
decent lawyer would have a conversation with a developer.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 34. Even for those permits that the state does continue to issue, Koontz would impact the 
permit review process in at least two ways. First, the state likely would conduct additional time-
consuming pre-decisional studies in light of the fact that it would bear the burden of proof on 
nexus and proportionality in any future takings case. Second, the state potentially could charge 
developers increased fees to cover the administrative costs of preparing such studies. 
 35. In a forthcoming paper, I contend that a pronounced shift in land use policy toward 
broad, unbending legislative measures could come with significant social implications, given that 
in many contexts only administrative processes afford crucially important attention to the affected 
parties’ human stories. See Mulvaney, supra note 25. Shelley Saxer approaches the problem from 
a different angle in asserting that “if land-use boards opt to deny projects instead of negotiate with 
developers to offset externalities by imposing conditions, such a behavioral change will 
detrimentally impact a community’s ability to gain the benefits of development, including 
improved services and revenue.” Saxer, supra note 20, at 6. 
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to Nollan and Dolan. While each of these additional courses could benefit 
from a far deeper assessment than space allows for here, they can be 
preliminarily summarized as follows.  
a.  Issuing More Unconditioned Permits 
The easiest way for state entities to avoid the prospect of retroactive 
takings liability under the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan is to 
issue unconditioned permits.  In this instance, the public will bear all of 
the external burdens of new development projects. While this course 
admittedly could produce some immediate benefits for developers, they, 
too, ultimately may suffer from an approach that effectively informs all 
landowners that they need not consider the effects of their land uses on 
others. 
b.  Strategic Proposal of Constitutional but Unpalatable Conditions 
Koontz notes that, where the state proposes multiple permit 
conditions, only one of those conditions need satisfy the strictures of 
Nollan and Dolan. The Court stated “[w]e agree with respondent that, so 
long as a permitting authority offers the landowner at least one alternative 
that would satisfy Nollan and Dolan, the landowner has not been 
subjected to an unconstitutional condition.”36 In certain cases, the state 
might use this holding to its advantage by assuring that it routinely 
proposes one outlandish condition that no rational developer would 
accept over the other proposed conditions but that nonetheless does not 
offend Nollan and Dolan’s requirements.  
The Nollan facts allow for a well-known illustration of this technique. 
The Nollan Court concluded that the exaction attached to the permit—a 
public walking easement along the ocean—would not alleviate the 
government’s stated concern that the development would block the 
public’s view of the ocean.37 However, the Court asserted that the state’s 
conditioning Nollan’s permit on his providing a public viewing platform 
on his upland property likely would meet the “essential nexus” test.38 It 
is unlikely that, if most homeowners were forced to choose, they would 
prefer such a public platform on their upland property over the north-
south transit easement along the oceanfront that the state actually 
                                                                                                                     
 36. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598. 
 37. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 838 (1987). 
 38. Id. at 836 (“[S]o long as the Commission could have exercised its police power . . . to 
forbid construction of the house altogether . . . [a] condition would be constitutional even if it 
consisted of the requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property for 
passersby with whose sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere.”). 
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proposed.39 Yet the holding in Koontz confirms that Nollan’s “nexus” test 
prohibited California from bestowing a discretionary development 
authorization in exchange for a non-“nexused” beach access way only 
because the state failed to present an option that was far less desirable to 
the applicant.  
Whether on the Nollan facts a condition requiring a viewing platform 
would have been considered “roughly proportional,” as Dolan came to 
require seven years after Nollan, is not clear. However, it is conceivable 
that some conditions that meet both Nollan and Dolan would be so 
objectionable to developers that they are pressed to choose the alternative 
conditions that do not technically comply with the “nexus” and 
“proportionality” tests but the permitting authority reasonably believes 
better serve the public interest. 
c.  Fashioning Restrictions As Use Limitations, Not Exactions 
The state might follow the successful path charted by the City of San 
Jose in a recent dispute by contending that the conditions at issue do not 
constitute exactions at all but rather merely place limitations on the way 
a landowner may use her property. In CBIA v. City of San Jose, the 
California Supreme Court declared that an ordinance requiring 
developers of twenty or more residential units to set aside at least fifteen 
percent of those units for affordable housing amounted to an ordinary 
regulatory restriction on the use of property, not an exaction, because the 
state’s action did not technically require the payment of money or the 
physical dedication of property to public use.40 The CBIA court even went 
one step further to assert that Nollan and Dolan do not apply in situations 
where the government action “makes clear that its purpose goes beyond 
mitigating the impacts attributable to the proposed developments that are 




                                                                                                                     
 39. See Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Comments on 
the Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 48 (1991); 
Timothy M. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 511, 522 n.42 (2012). 
 40. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 988 (Cal. 2015) (“[T]here 
can be no valid unconstitutional-conditions takings claim without a government exaction of 
property, and the ordinance in the present case does not effect an exaction. Rather, the ordinance 
is an example of a municipality’s permissible regulation of the use of land under its broad police 
power.”); id. at 991 (“[L]ike many other land use regulations, this condition simply places a 
restriction on the way the developer may use its property by limiting the price for which the 
developer may offer some of its units for sale.”). The claimants have filed a petition for certiorari 
with the U.S. Supreme Court.  
 41. Id. at 1000. 
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d.  Challenging the Premise that an Illegal Act Can Give Rise to 
Takings Liability 
The final two courses entail more broadly contesting Nollan and 
Dolan’s foundations, and they could be adopted in conjunction with most 
of those courses already presented. While challenging the very premise 
of the Court’s now-entrenched exaction takings jurisprudence is a tall 
task, a governmental entity making such a claim could look to the silver 
lining of the otherwise confounding recent decision in Starr International 
Company v. U.S.42 for support. In a complaint described by the news 
editor of the National Review as “shameless,”43 AIG shareholders alleged 
that the Federal Reserve Bank had imposed overly demanding conditions 
on an $85 billion, taxpayer-funded bailout loan that allowed the company 
to avoid bankruptcy.44 To many observers’ surprise, the federal district 
court found the federal government liable for an “illegal exaction” on the 
theory that the government had usurped its authority under the Federal 
Reserve Act by taking an equity share in a rescued company.45 Yet the 
court simultaneously asserted that illegal exactions cannot give rise to 
Fifth Amendment takings liability.46 By way of analogy, then, Starr 
International leaves government entities in land use exaction cases with 
the possible defense that conditions deemed illegal on the similar, 
unconstitutional conditions logic of Koontz cannot give rise to takings 
liability and its associated compensation remedy either.  
Such an approach is far from a slam dunk; Koontz very well may be 
interpreted to preclude this line of reasoning in the future. But at the 
moment, given the vague and perplexing nature of the majority opinion 
in Koontz,47 this position theoretically remains viable and, in the right 
circumstances, could find sympathetic ears in some courts. 
e.  Renewing an Unqualified Challenge to Nollan and Dolan  
Taking the prior approach one step further, government entities might 
reinvigorate the long dormant and admittedly uphill battle to reverse 
Nollan and Dolan in their entirety.48 Nollan and Dolan accept that the 
                                                                                                                     
 42. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428 (2015).  
 43.  Tim Cavanaugh, 5 Reasons the Gov’t Might Lose the AIG Lawsuit, NAT’L REV. (Oct. 
10, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/389994/5-reasons-govt-might-lose-aig-
lawsuit-tim-cavanaugh?target=author&tid=1107329. 
 44. Starr Int’l Co., 121 Fed. Cl. at 430–31. 
 45. Id. at 434. 
 46. Id. at 472. 
 47. On the confusing nature of Koontz, see, for example, Echeverria, supra note 19; 
Echeverria, supra note 20; Fenster, supra note 20; Nolon, supra note 1. 
 48. Laura Underkuffler offered some compelling, wide-ranging remarks in this regard in 
her keynote address at the Association for Law, Property and Society Annual Conference in May 
of 2015. Laura Underkuffler, Keynote Address at the 2015 ALPS Conference at the University of 
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government could deny the relevant permit application outright under the 
current state of the law “unless the denial would interfere so drastically 
with the [claimants’] use of their property”49 under the traditional 
regulatory takings framework first discussed in Penn Central. Few, if 
any, would suggest that denials of the permit applications on the Nollan 
and Dolan facts would constitute such a drastic interference, for the 
claimants in those cases already were putting their respective parcels to 
significant use.50 One might question, then, why the Court found it 
appropriate to apply heightened judicial scrutiny when reviewing (and to 
afford the possibility of a compensatory remedy for) government 
proposals that the applicant might prefer to the legal status quo.51  
f.  Summary 
Each of the five additional approaches presented above surely comes 
with considerable uncertainty for the state, and this essay does not 
advocate for any of them on normative grounds. Rather, they are offered 
here simply to demonstrate that, in the post-Koontz world in which 
permitting entities must operate, the list of potential government moves 
is even more expansive than Professor Nolon’s article stakes out. It may 
be fodder for future empirical work to determine which of these 
approaches—and the assuredly many other approaches that are not 
discussed here—the myriad state and municipal entities adopt moving 
forward.  
CONCLUSION 
Seizing on an opening created by the Supreme Court’s vague opinion 
in Koontz, the recent state appellate decision on remand extends the 
retroactive takings compensation principle of First English into the realm 
of exactions. This decision serves to highlight the chilling effect 
emanating from Koontz about which Professor Nolon is rightly 
concerned. Professor Nolon explained how the list of potential 
government responses in the confusing and chilling post-Koontz world is 
extensive, and this essay adds even more possibilities. Unless and until 
the Supreme Court conducts a pragmatic reevaluation of its exaction 
                                                                                                                     
Georgia: From Bailouts to Bogs—Shaking the Takings Money Tree (May 1, 2015) (written 
remarks on file with author). 
 49. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987). See also Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 394 (1994). 
 50. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, The Remnants of Exaction Takings, 33 ENVIRONS 198, 226 
(2010) (explaining that a successful takings claim “depends on the court’s determination of the 
whole unity of property at issue”). 
 51. See, e.g., Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428, 444 (2015) (“[T]he AIG 
Board of Directors decided that accepting the loan was a better alternative than bankruptcy.”); 
Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 287, 334–35; 
Underkuffler, supra note 48. 
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takings jurisprudence,52 each potential response is in need of deep 
analytical and empirical assessment. Professor Nolon’s article 
thoughtfully starts us on this path. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 52. The final chapter of the Koontz saga is yet to be written, as the state has filed a petition 
for certiorari with the Florida Supreme Court seeking review of the decision on remand.  
